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Much is said about Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) publics opposing gender 
equality, often referring to patriarchal Islam. However, nuanced large-scale studies 
addressing which specific aspects of religiosity affect support for gender equality across 
the MENA are conspicuously absent. This study develops and tests a gendered agentic 
socialization framework that proposes that MENA citizens are not only passively social-
ized by religion but also have agency (within their religiosity). This disaggregates the 
influence of religiosity, highlights its multifacetedness, and theorizes the moderating roles 
that gender and sociocognitive empowerment play via gendered processes of agentic dis-
sociations. Using 15 World Values Surveys and multilevel models, our analyses show that 
most dimensions of religiosity fuel opposition to gender equality. However, the salience of 
religion in daily life is found to increase women’s support for gender equality and cushion 
the negative impact of religious service attendance. Also, gender and education moderate 
the impacts of several religiosity dimensions; for instance, women’s (initially greater) sup-
port for gender equality more sharply declines with increased service attendance than 
men’s. Altogether, this study finds that religious socialization is multifaceted and gendered, 
and that certain men and women are inclined and equipped to deviate from dominant 
patriarchal religious interpretations.
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Arab Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) publics report one of the world’s lowest rates of support for gender equality (Norris 2009; 
Price 2016), and, consequently, the Arab MENA shows relatively large 
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political and socioeconomic inequalities between men and women 
(Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Thorough knowledge of what 
drives the MENA publics’ resistance to gender equality is thus pivotal to 
address real-world inequalities. However, previous public opinion research 
and Western public debates explain opposition to gender equality in the 
MENA by pointing rather unidimensionally to Muslims’ (vs. non- 
Muslims’) patriarchal religious socialization (Alexander and Welzel 2011; 
Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Moaddel 2006; Rizzo, 
Meyer, and Ali 2007). This narrative breathes Orientalism: a homogenous 
MENA “other” characterized by irrationality, oppression, passiveness, 
and, most of all, patriarchal Islam is opposed to “the self,” the progressive, 
active, secular West (Abu-Lughod 2002; Korteweg 2008; Said 1979), 
without acknowledging or theorizing how religiosity is a multifaceted and 
gendered force.
The present study aims to understand relations between religiosity and 
support for gender equality in the Arab MENA in a more sophisticated 
manner by developing and testing new theoretical notions of “agentic 
socialization.” These notions build on multidisciplinary insights from 
classic sociology, in-depth qualitative studies, and feminist scholarship 
(e.g., Avishai and Irby 2017; Charrad 2011; Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 
2003; Sewell 1992; Spierings 2015). The agentic socialization framework 
rejects claims that MENA inhabitants are solely and uniformly passively 
socialized to oppose gender equality. Instead, it proposes that MENA 
citizens have agency—even within dominant patriarchal socialization—
and that socialization processes are gendered (see also Moghissi 2011; 
Read and Bartkowski 2000; Zion-Waldoks 2015). The framework thus 
stresses that women and men might “live” their religion differently and 
have the ability to bargain with their religion and interpret it in ways that 
deviate from the dominant patriarchal mainstream (Hall 1997; Kandiyoti 
1988; Rinaldo 2014).
In applying our framework, we propose that religious socialization may 
be gendered and particularly women may be more inclined to make up their 
own minds on gender equality and religion and that sociocognitive empow-
erment may equip people to agentically deviate from patriarchal religious 
interpretations. We thus theorize specifically how gender and education 
shape religious reinterpretations. This implies that relations between peo-
ple’s religiosity and their support for gender equality differ by gender and 
education, which we test empirically (Khurshid 2015; Prickett 2015).
To understand how religion can be both a source of emancipatory rein-
terpretations and patriarchal socialization, we argue that it is necessary to 
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take a more refined approach to individual-level religiosity than to focus 
on differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, as is done in most 
MENA public opinion studies (e.g., Alexander and Welzel 2011; Lussier 
and Fish 2016; Price 2016). We therefore disaggregate the concept of 
religion and conceptualize it multidimensionally. Sociology of religion 
scholars have shown that religiosity is indeed multidimensional and com-
plex, identifying among others: communal practices (e.g., attending reli-
gious services), doctrinal beliefs (e.g., textualism), devotion (e.g., religious 
self-perception), and salience (e.g., religion-driven daily choices) 
(Cornwall et al. 1986; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Stark and Glock 1968). 
Appreciating these distinctions allows us to address more precisely in 
which ways religiosity might have different implications for women and 
more highly educated citizens than for men and lower educated citizens. 
Altogether, our research question reads: To what extent are different 
dimensions of religiosity related to support for gender equality in the Arab 
MENA, and how do these relations differ for women and more highly 
educated individuals?
RELIGIOUS SOCIALIzATION RECONSIDERED
The Agentic Socialization Framework
Our agentic socialization framework aims to understand support for 
gender equality in the Arab MENA in a nuanced manner by refining and 
integrating classic sociological frames and gender theories (Abu-Lughod 
2002; Avishai and Irby 2017; Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003; Kandiyoti 
1988; Korteweg 2008; Sewell 1992; Stark and Glock 1968). At its core, 
the framework emphasizes that MENA citizens are embedded in domi-
nantly patriarchal religious structures, but that socialization processes 
within those structures differ between men and women. Moreover, citi-
zens have the agency to reinterpret their religion; women and men in the 
MENA are not solely passively socialized to follow prevailing religious 
interpretations but can give alternative, progressive meanings to their 
religiosity that are more conducive to support for gender equality.
Our framework departs from life course theory (Elder, Johnson, and 
Crosnoe 2003) and agency-structure duality’s (Sewell 1992) assertion that 
people are always embedded in spatio-temporal contexts with pre-existing 
(socially constructed) structures that shape their lives. Here we focus on 
the established patriarchal interpretations of religion in which MENA 
citizens are embedded from birth and childhood on (Al-Hibri 1982; Mir-
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Hosseini 2006; Moghissi 2011). Integration in and socialization by these 
pre-existing religious structures shape MENA citizens’ lives, including 
the meanings they attach to gender. In other words, the more integrated 
individuals are in this patriarchal religion in general, the less likely they 
are to support gender equality. Simultaneously, these theories propose that 
people have the agency to construct their own lives within their contexts 
rather than to merely reproduce patriarchal interpretations from genera-
tion to generation (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003, 11).
Regarding agency and gender, Kandiyoti proposed in her influential 
work that women use strategies to maneuver specific patriarchal contexts 
(1988, 275). In the following debate, some argued that women’s agency is 
found in resisting religion, which equates agency to secularism and thus 
denies religious women their agency while still conceptualizing religion 
as a unidimensional force that singularly oppresses women (Abu-Lughod 
2002; Korteweg 2008). Other scholars emphasized “illiberal agency,” 
which claims that religious women might exercise agency in actively 
being orthodox even when that reinforces patriarchal religious structures 
(Avishai 2008; Mahmood 2005). This position has been criticized for 
stretching “agency” so far that it becomes a hollow term (Moghissi 2011; 
Rinaldo 2014).
In our framework, we transcend both views and integrate them into 
contemporary sociological theories. Our premise is that people are 
indeed—to different degrees—socialized by patriarchal religious struc-
tures, but that people embedded in these patriarchal religious structures 
have the agency to subvert dominant religious interpretations to promote 
their (gendered) interests (see also Korteweg 2008; Rinaldo 2014). 
Paradoxically, dominant patriarchal religious structures thus provide the 
very conditions for agentic re-interpretations of religion (Jansen 2004; 
Mir-Hosseini 2006; Prickett 2015). Religious MENA citizens—especially 
women—thus should not be considered to be solely passively socialized 
by patriarchal religious structures but capable of actively negotiating reli-
gious meanings attached to gender by drawing on alternative religious and 
secular sources (Read and Bartkowski 2000).
This framework signifies “religion” as dynamic and negotiable, allow-
ing room to advance support for gender equality but simultaneously as 
containing rigid oppressive structures that socialize citizens into patriar-
chal worldviews. To understand how religious socialization shapes peo-
ple’s support for gender equality in negotiable ways, we argue that 
religiosity needs to be conceptualized in a multidimensional way because 
different manifestations of individual-level religiosity have different 
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implications regarding socialization and negotiability, as will be theorized 
more concretely below.
In line with classic and more contemporary distinctions, we firstly 
differentiate between (external) religious practices and (internal) reli-
gious beliefs (see Figure 1) (Cornwall et al. 1986; Hall 1997; Kellstedt 
et al. 1996; Stark and Glock 1968). We further subdivide religious 
practices into two categories: private religious behaviors that are acted 
out without others, and communal practices, such as attending religious 
services, that imply exposure to the institutional patriarchal establish-
ment’s home (Aune 2015; Mir-Hosseini 2006; Nyhagen 2017). 
Concerning religious beliefs, a further distinction can be made as well. 
Doctrinal beliefs stipulate the interpretation of one’s religion, whereas 
affective beliefs relate to feelings of attachment to religion regardless 
of the specific content of those beliefs. Affective beliefs encompass a 
more general and abstract attachment to religion in and of itself (“devo-
tion”) and feelings that religion specifically guides daily life choices 
(“salience”). Below, we apply our theoretical framework to communal 
practices (attendance), doctrinal beliefs (textualism), and affective 
beliefs (devotion and salience), the dimensions we could incorporate 
empirically.
Multidimensional Religious Socialization
Whereas previous quantitative MENA studies have predominantly 
drawn on unidimensional socialization perspectives (e.g., Alexander and 
Welzel 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Price 
2016), our multidimensional framework emphasizes that different dimen-
sions of religiosity link differently to socialization and support for gender 
equality. First, attending religious services entails exposure to the MENA’s 
structural “ruling patriarchal establishment,” which generally preaches 
FiGURe 1: Conceptual Scheme of Religiosity
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gendered worldviews of men and women being complementary and hier-
archically related (Al-Hibri 1982, ix; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). 
Frequent attendance therefore is expected to increase the likelihood that 
such messages will be internalized, corroding support for gender equality 
(Hervieu-Léger 1998; Sumerau 2012). Second, doctrinal beliefs are 
expected to influence support for gender equality (Al-Hibri 1982; 
Kucinskas 2010; Moghadam 2013; Spierings 2015). The doctrinal belief 
we specifically focus on is “textualism” (Rinaldo 2014): the belief that 
religious texts have one static literalist meaning—voiced by the institu-
tionalized patriarchy—instead of a spirit to be interpreted in light of the 
time they were written (Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent 2016; Moghissi 
2011). For example, the Quran and Hadith can be interpreted textually, or 
literally, as a point-blank condemnation of taking your own life,1 while 
contextualists have proposed more lenient conclusions based on the cur-
rent rapid expansions of Muslim-majority countries’ populations (Shapiro 
2013). Textualist readings generally oppose gender equality. For instance, 
interpreting the Quran’s proclamations on inheritance textually stipulates 
that women’s shares should literally be half of men’s (4:11, Khan trans.). 
Contextual interpretations stress an emancipatory spirit as women are 
allocated more than the nothing they generally had in the seventh century 
before Islam (Mir-Hosseini 2006; Selim 2003). Altogether, we thus expect 
that: The frequency of communal religious service attendance and holding 
textualist beliefs are negatively related to support for gender equality 
(Hypothesis 1).
Drawing attention to affective beliefs, our framework however sug-
gests that religiosity might actually fuel support for gender equality. 
Counter to doctrinal beliefs, religious affect does not reflect a certain 
(patriarchal) content of beliefs, but rather it reflects on the attachment to 
religion in and of itself, to the main undercurrents of religion. These 
main religious tenets of monotheistic religions have been argued to 
involve benevolent traits related to mercy, generosity, and fairness 
(Schwartz and Huismans 1995). Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche’s 
review (2015, 205), for instance, points out that “the major religious 
traditions all emphasize compassion.” Regarding Islam, one of the five 
pillars, Zakat, specifically concerns charity, and the Quran designates 
Allah as al-Rahman (Most Merciful) and al-Rahim (Compassionate). 
Similarly, El Fadl (2001, 9) has illustrated the Islamic ethos as one of 
general egalitarianism: “Islam rejects elitism and emphasizes that truth 
is equally accessible to all Muslims regardless of race, class, or gender.” 
Altogether, we hypothesize that: The stronger peoples’ affective  religious 
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beliefs (devotion and salience), the higher their support for gender 
equality (Hypothesis 2).
Gendered Socialization and Agentic Reinterpretation
As our agentic socialization framework proposes that citizens are not 
uniformly passively sculpted by dominant religious interpretations, but 
that socialization processes may differ for different societal groups, the 
impact of individuals’ religiosity may vary with their gender and educa-
tion (Khurshid 2015; Rinaldo 2014). Several mechanisms lead us to 
expect that religiosity’s impact on support for gender equality is gendered, 
including women’s personal interests and the gender conservative sociali-
zation in the MENA region overall (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). 
Concerning people’s interests, gender equality is generally considered to 
be more in the direct interest of women than men. Currently men benefit 
from being designated head of households with greater legal rights. 
Therefore, women may be more inclined to diverge from patriarchal reli-
gious messages and seek or accept alternative interpretations that allow 
them more rights, as several in-depth studies have shown (Jansen 2004; 
Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent 2016; Moghissi 2011; Prickett 2015; Read 
and Bartkowski 2000; Rinaldo 2014; Selim 2003; Zion-Waldoks 2015). 
Women may also be socialized differently than men. While men tend to 
be taught to be aggressive, competitive, household leaders, women’s 
socialization accentuates their supposedly emotional, affectionate, caring, 
gentle, and overall benevolent nature (Gonzalez 2011; Lueptow, Garovich-
Szabo, and Lueptow 2001). Women’s socialization into benevolence—
apart from religious benevolence—has been shown to translate to greater 
social compassion and support for gender equality (Eagly et al. 2004). 
Both gendered interests and gendered socialization thus lead us to expect 
that women will support gender equality more than men, but also that 
religion’s impact will vary between women and men. Still, as Lussier and 
Fish (2016, 35) note, “surprisingly little has been written about the inter-
section between sex and religious identification with regard to attitudes 
about gender inequality.”
Filling this lacuna, first we propose that the gender gap in support for 
gender equality will close with stronger integration in the established 
religious patriarchy. Low integration in institutionalized religion—that is, 
not frequenting services and not adhering to strict textualism—is expected 
to bolster space to deviate from patriarchal religious interpretations. 
Given gendered socialization and interests, we then propose that espe-
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cially women will use that space (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004), whereas 
men have no incentive to reinterpret their religion on top of their more 
conservative socialization.
However, stronger integration in the institutional patriarchy—with its 
authoritative truth-claims of the proper interpretation of religion—is 
expected to leave little wiggle room for those agentic deviations. Religious 
service attendance and textualism thus are expected to shrink spaces that 
particularly women use, impeding especially women’s propensity to 
benevolent reinterpretations. At the same time, it is also theoretically pos-
sible that, for instance, women who frequent services represent a selective 
group that is more gender conservative even before attendance. Still, here 
it should be noted again that intergenerational transmissions of religiosity 
and the structural character of religious institutions render this possibility 
less likely. Also, the most conservative women might not attend services 
because there are no facilities or because they believe they should pray at 
home. Not attending services is thus not one-to-one translated to being 
less conservative, which is also illustrated by the fact that a substantial 
number of women attend services at least once a week, but even more do 
so less often.2 Moreover, a wealth of ethnographic research in this area 
shows that even if attendance is partly a process of self-selection, it seems 
unlikely that women’s gender attitudes also are unaffected by attendance 
(see Bartkowski and Read 2003; Prickett 2015; Read and Bartkowski 
2000). Several studies have even pointed out that women who attend reli-
gious services start off more progressive but amend their views following 
service attendance (see Chong 2006; Griffith 1997). Altogether, we expect 
that, compared to men’s, women’s initially greater support for gender 
equality will be more sharply reduced when they attend services and 
adhere to textualist beliefs, narrowing the gender gap in support for gen-
der equality. Or formulated in more technical terms: Negative relation-
ships between religious service attendance and textualism and support for 
gender equality are stronger for women than men (Hypothesis 3).
Women’s reinterpretations are however not expected to be stonewalled 
by all dimensions of religiosity, drawing our attention to affective beliefs. 
Affective religious beliefs—feelings of attachment to religion rather than 
particular beliefs regarding its proper content—are expected to enlarge 
room for reinterpretations as they are disconnected from the institutional 
religious patriarchy and, as noted, may inspire interpreting religion benev-
olently. Women’s socialization into compassion and incentives to reinter-
pret their religion are expected to drive women especially to make good 
use of affective beliefs’ space for renegotiations (Prickett 2015; Read and 
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Bartkowski 2000; Rinaldo 2014). We thus expect that: Affective religious 
beliefs are positively related to support for gender equality especially 
among women rather than among men (Hypothesis 4).
Agentic socialization also draws attention to being better equipped to 
diverge from patriarchal religious socialization, which might have par-
ticular implications for the role of education. As others have argued, more 
highly educated people’s cognitive skills allow them to reconcile more 
easily seemingly contradictory views such as strongly religious and femi-
nist ones (Moghadam 2013). Also, their advantaged social position 
implies that the more highly educated are more likely to encounter diver-
gent views on (religious interpretations of) gender norms, increasing their 
awareness of alternatives (Shamaileh 2016). Because of these resources, 
more highly educated people are expected to deviate from patriarchal 
religious interpretations more often, provided space for such renegotia-
tions exists. Thus, among those who are less integrated in the institutional 
religious patriarchy, the more highly educated are expected to support 
gender equality more. However, this educational gap in support for gender 
equality will close with greater service attendance and textualism. In tech-
nical terms: Negative relations between religious service attendance and 
textualism and support for gender equality are stronger among the more 
highly educated than the lower educated (Hypothesis 5).
Still, as seen, affective religious beliefs do not imply integration in the 
institutional religious patriarchy and are expected to inspire benevolent 
reinterpretations. Following their greater cognitive skills and awareness of 
alternatives, especially more highly educated people are expected to use 
this space and renegotiate religious meanings of gender (Moghadam 
2013). Particularly the more highly educated may thus translate affective 
beliefs into support for gender equality: Affective religious beliefs are 
positively related to support for gender equality especially among the 
more highly educated rather than the lower educated (Hypothesis 6).
Finally, regarding the different dimensions of religiosity, our agentic 
socialization framework also proposes that citizens can reinterpret their 
religion in its own terms. Greater religious affect might make people 
rethink, contest, or buffer some dominant oppressive religious interpreta-
tions, as affective beliefs are expected to create knowledge of and adher-
ence to religion’s main benevolent messages (Bloom, Arikan, and 
Courtemanche 2015; Schwartz and Huismans 1995). For instance, attach-
ment to the general notion of “love thy neighbor” could be expected to 
make more devoted people less passively receptive to patriarchal views 
voiced in services. Similarly, considering the benevolent side of religion, 
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it is expected that when religion is more saliently guiding people’s daily 
life choices, textualism is translated less strongly to judging others, 
including prescribing how women should behave. We thus expect that: 
Relations between attending religious services and textualism and support 
for gender equality are weaker with higher levels of religious affect, that 
is, devotion and salience (Hypothesis 7).
METhODS
This study uses the MENA subset of the World Values Survey. Of 
these, 15 surveys (2001-2014) included the items needed. They represent 
12 countries: Algeria (2x), Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (2x), Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco (2x), Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen. All 
surveys target representativeness for the population of 18 years and older, 
using stratified random sampling. These data are representative regarding 
gender and age for most populations, and sometimes for education and 
regional distributions as well.3 The initial dataset contained 20,254 
respondents; after listwise deletion 19,009 respondents (94 percent) 
remained. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics.
Support for Gender Equality
We operationalize support for gender equality using three widely used 
items on gender equality in the public sphere in particular. The three items 
asked respondents to which extent they agreed with the statements: “On 
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (four-point 
scale), “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” 
(four-point scale), and “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right 
to a job than women” (three-point scale) (e.g., Blaydes and Linzer 2008; 
Kostenko, Kuzmuchev, and Ponarin 2016; Price 2016; Spierings 2014). 
Factor analyses showed that these items tap into the same underlying fac-
tor overall and in 16 of 17 surveys separately,4 indicating measurement 
equivalency (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997). All items were recoded so 
that higher scores indicate greater support for gender equality. To approx-
imate a normal distribution, we took the square root of the mean scores of 
the three items, weighted by their factor loadings to create the index sup-
port for gender equality. For ease of interpretation, the final scale was 
rescaled to run from 0 to 100. The descriptive analyses present a simple 
summed scale, as is mentioned.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all (Prestandardized) Variables
N Min. Max. Mean SD
Dependent variable
 Support for gender equality 19,009 0 100 35.37 24.10
Religion variables
 Religious service 
attendance*
19,009 0 1 0.59 0.39
 Textualism* 19,009 0 1 0.92 0.16
 Devotion* 19,009 0 1 0.78 0.32
 Salience* 19,009 0 1 0.95 0.12
Agency variables
 Gender 19,009  
  Men 0 1 0.51  
  Women 0 1 0.49  
 Education* 19,009 0 1 0.45 0.34
Control variables
 Denomination 19,009  
  Muslim 0 1 0.96  
  Non-Muslim 0 1 0.04  
 Age* 19,009 18 93 37.03 14.00
 Age2,* 19,009 324 8,649 1566.92 1199.35
 Marital status 19,009  
  Not married 0 1 0.33  
  Separated 0 1 0.03  
  Widowed 0 1 0.04  
  Married 0 1 0.60  
 Employment status 19,009  
  Full-time employed 0 1 0.28  
  Part-time employed 0 1 0.09  
  Self-employed 0 1 0.13  
  Retired 0 1 0.05  
  Homemaker 0 1 0.25  
  Student 0 1 0.10  
  Non-employed 0 1 0.10  
Robustness check variables
 Prayer 11,456  
  Prayer WVS 4* 1,132 0 1 0.71 0.43
  Prayer WVS 5* 1,067 0 1 0.87 0.34
  Prayer WVS 6* 9,257 0 1 0.75 0.40
 Particularism 14,959  
  Not particularistic 0 1 0.61  
  Particularistic 0 1 0.39  
NOTE: Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum; SD = standard deviation.
SOURCE: WVS.
*Variable is z-scored for analyses.
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Religiosity
We measure the frequency of religious service attendance with the ques-
tion “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days?” (never, less than once a year, once a year, 
only on holy days, once a month, once a week, more than once a week). 
The scores were rescaled to a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.
Textualism—interpreting religious texts statically and literally instead of 
contextually—is measured by the proxy of respondents’ views regarding the 
justifiability of euthanasia and suicide. As noted in the theory section, taking 
your own life (by euthanasia or suicide) is textually prohibited but contextu-
ally permitted, making these measurements useful proxies for textualism 
(Shapiro 2013). These measurements, however, only pertain to one particu-
lar issue (i.e., taking one’s own life). Had the data permitted it, it would have 
been ideal to include other issues or a more direct measurement, although 
we have no strong reason to expect that being a textualist on other issues 
relates differently to support for gender equality. Moreover, as discussed 
below, in our robustness tests we included particularism as an alternative 
measurement of doctrinal beliefs, which was measured unrelated to specific 
issues, and it is similarly related to support for gender equality. To opera-
tionalize textualism, we averaged the two 10-point items and rescaled it to 
a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. Higher values signal greater 
textualism. As the distributions of the two scales were similar, respondents 
were included if they had a valid score on at least one indicator.
Concerning affective beliefs, we distinguished devotion and salience 
(see Stark and Glock 1968). Devotion—an abstract attachment to religion 
itself—is measured using two items that have been shown to tap the same 
concept before (Spierings 2014): (a) “Independently of whether you 
attend religious services or not, would you say you are” a religious person 
(scored as 1), not a religious person, or a convinced atheist (following 
Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer [2007], the last two are both scored 0); and 
(b) “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?” 
Respondents who chose “religious faith” were considered to be more 
devoted (1) than others (0). The scores of respondents with at least one 
valid answer were averaged to the scale “devotion.”
Salience—a specific attachment to religion as a guide in (daily) life—
was measured by another two items: “How important is God in your life?” 
(ten-point scale, 0 to 1), and “For each of the following, indicate how 
important it is in your life. Would you say religion is very important (1), 
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rather important, not very important, or not at all important (0)?” If at least 
one item was answered validly, scores were averaged to the continuous 
scale “salience.”
Our measurements of devotion and salience are less distinct from 
each other than the theoretical concepts, as there are no data available 
on the salience of religion in specific daily life choices. However, 
empirically devotion and salience are not very strongly related and do 
not cause multicollinearity issues (see online Appendix 1). We thus 
include both in our analyses to make our results as nuanced and inform-
ative as possible.
Gender and Education
To study the gendered effects of religiosity, we measure respondents’ 
gender as observed by the interviewer (0: woman; 1: man). Education, the 
second moderator, includes four categories across surveys: “no formal edu-
cation completed” (0); “complete elementary” and “incomplete secondary” 
(combined into “elementary,” 0.33); “complete secondary” and “incomplete 
university education” (combined into “secondary,” 0.67); and “complete 
university education and higher” (1).
Control Variables
Denomination, age, marital status, and employment status are included 
as control variables. Respondents’ self-reported denomination, distinguish-
ing between Muslims and non-Muslims, is controlled in our models, and 
we also established our results are substantially similar when we estimate 
models for Muslims separately. The Bahrain 2014 survey does not include 
denomination, but virtually all native Bahrainis are Muslim and considered 
as such here. Unfortunately, a more refined distinction among either 
Muslims or non-Muslims was not available in the majority of the surveys; 
comparing Muslims and non-Muslims does make our results comparable 
to other studies (e.g., Lussier and Fish 2016; Norris 2009). Age is a con-
tinuous scale; respondents under 18 were excluded as they were not sam-
pled in all surveys. Age squared is included to capture important life course 
effects. Marital status is distinguished by four groups: married, widowed, 
separated, and never married. Employment status encompasses “fulltime 
employed,” “part-time employed,” “self-employed,” “retired,” “home-
maker,” “student,” and “non-employed” (including “unemployed” and 
“other non-employed”).
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Analytic Strategy
Our data have to be modeled using multilevel models to control for 
clustered observations within country-years and countries; one-level 
models would deflate our p-values and increase the chance of type I 
errors. Random intercepts are included at the higher levels (country-time; 
country).5 This takes into account the clustered structure of the data and 
prevents us from drawing false positive conclusions. To further increase 
the rigor of our tests we also conducted various robustness checks, which 
we briefly discuss after our main results as they yielded similar findings.
SUppORT FOR GENDER EqUALITY IN ThE  
NEw MILLENNIUM
How supportive of gender equality (focused on equal participation in the 
public sphere) are MENA publics in the new millennium? Figure 2 presents 
the mean scores on the three items used to measure support for gender 
equality (without taking their square root) and shows that respondents score 
an average of 36 out of 100 in the WVS data. As a point of reference, when 
we analyze all countries included in the most recent WVS wave, the MENA 
region has the lowest pooled average in the WVS. It is several points below 
that of the next United Nations–defined regions—Southern Asia and West 













FiGURe 2: Mean Support for Public Gender equality per Gender per Survey 
(N = 19,009)
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considerable differences within the MENA region; for instance, women’s 
average support is 43, while men’s is less than 30.
ExpLAINING SUppORT FOR GENDER EqUALITY
Table 2 presents the multilevel regression results for support for gender 
equality. Model 1 includes all direct effects of religiosity (Hypotheses 1 
and 2); in Models 2 and 3, the moderations between religiosity and gender 
and education are added, respectively (Hypotheses 3 through 6); Model 4 
includes interaction terms between the different dimensions of religiosity 
themselves (Hypothesis 7). All models include the control variables, 
which relate to support for gender equality as expected (see Lussier and 
Fish 2016; Price 2016); for instance, education has a clear positive impact, 
and women tend to be considerably more supportive of gender equality: 
more than 15 points on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Multidimensional Religiosity
Model 1 suggests that religiosity mostly fuels opposition to gender 
equality. MENA inhabitants who attend religious services more fre-
quently, who interpret their religion textually, and who are more devoted, 
all oppose gender equality more. However, the salience of religious 
beliefs is the exception to the rule, as it shows no clear significant relation-
ship to support for gender equality. Additional analyses indicate this is 
partly due to contradictory effects in different contexts (see online 
Appendix 2). Altogether, these results support hypothesis 1 and lead us to 
reject hypothesis 2.
Gender and Education
Turning our attention to Model 2, we should first repeat that, as 
expected following gendered socialization and gendered interests, wom-
en’s support for gender equality overall is far greater than men’s, as is the 
case after taking religiosity and other factors into account (cf. Figure 2). 
Thus, women can and do interpret gender equality differently from men, 
“even” in patriarchal MENA countries (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).
Model 2 furthermore shows that several dimensions of religiosity also 
are differently related to support for gender equality for women and men. 
First, service attendance is associated with a sharper decline in support 
for gender equality among women than among men. As expected, when 
Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION 701
Table 2: Multilevel analyses of support for public gender equality  
(N = 19,009)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 b SE b SE b SE b SE
Religious service 
attendance
−1.12 0.18 −0.56 0.26 −1.13 0.18 −1.16 0.18
 *Women −0.86 0.36  
 *Education −0.61 0.16  
 *Devotion 0.15 0.17
 *Salience 0.42 0.19
Textualism −0.88 0.17 −0.97 0.24 −0.92 0.17 −0.81 0.18
 *Women 0.17 0.33  
 *Education 0.14♂ 0.17  
 *Devotion 0.17* 0.15
 *Salience 0.07 0.11
Devotion −0.62 0.18 −0.14 0.24 −0.59 0.18 −0.56 0.18
 *Women −1.12 0.34  
 *Education −0.13 0.18  
Salience −0.30 0.19 −1.53 0.24 −0.32 0.19 −0.19 0.21
 *Women 2.70 0.35  
 *Education 0.16♀ 0.18  
Gender: Women (ref. = men) 15.46 0.42 15.65 0.42 15.35 0.42 15.50 0.42
Education 3.24 0.19 3.22 0.19 3.25 0.19 3.23 0.19
Denomination: Muslim (ref. 
= non-Muslim)
−4.83 0.89 −4.90 0.89 −4.95 0.89 −4.87 0.89
Age −0.53 1.05 −0.54 1.04 −0.40 1.05 −0.53 1.05
Age2 0.78 1.01 0.82 1.01 0.64 1.01 0.77 1.01
Marital status
 Not married 0.61 0.48 0.71 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.61 0.48
 Separated 2.73 0.96 2.70 0.96 2.76 0.96 2.69 0.96
 Widowed −1.45 0.86 −1.50 0.86 −1.38 0.86 −1.45 0.86
Employment status
 Part-time employed −1.08 0.62 −1.02 0.62 −1.09 0.62 −1.10 0.62
 Self-employed −2.24 0.55 −2.29 0.55 −2.29 0.55 −2.27 0.55
 Retired −1.11 0.85 −1.24 0.85 −1.21 0.85 −1.13 0.85
 Homemaker −5.08 0.57 −5.31 0.57 −4.92 0.57 −5.07 0.57
 Student 0.28 0.69 0.17 0.69 0.25 0.69 0.24 0.69
 Non-employed −1.09 0.62 −1.23 0.62 −1.14 0.62 −1.10 0.62
Intercept 34.73 1.85 34.58 1.85 34.86 1.83 34.71 1.85
Variance
 Country-year 38.1 38.1 37.4 38.3
 Individual 473.0 471.1 472.6 472.8
NOTE: Bold coefficients indicate significance at α = 0.05, italics at α = 0.10. *, ♀, and ♂ 
indicate parameter is only significant in the Muslim subsample, female subsample, or male 
subsample, respectively. 
SOURCE: WVS.
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women do not attend religious services, they are more supportive of gen-
der equality than men (about 50 vs. 35), but service attendance reduces 
women’s support with (−0.56 − 0.86) −1.42, while it only reduces men’s 
with –0.56. These findings provide support for hypothesis 3, but only 
partially, as a similar effect is not found for textualism. Face-to-face 
exposure to members of the religious patriarchy voicing authoritative 
messages thus probably shrinks spaces for emancipatory reinterpreta-
tions that especially women are initially inclined to use, reducing the 
gender gap in support.
Second and interestingly, religious salience turns out to be negatively 
related to support for gender equality among men (−1.53), but actually 
increases support for gender equality among women (−1.53 + 2.70 = 
1.17), as is illustrated in Figure 3. So, women who are more affectively 
attached to their religion support gender equality more, while among men 
the stronger believers support gender equality less. We did not find this for 
devotion; thus, only partial support is found for hypothesis 4. These find-
ings illustrate that among women, salience—that is, the importance of 
religion in daily life—is the religiosity dimension that also functions as a 
help, not a hurdle, to support for gender equality.
Relations between several religiosity indicators and support for gender 
equality also are moderated by educational attainment. Model 3 first indi-
cates that the negative impact of religious service attendance strengthens 
when education increases. As expected, more highly educated individuals’ 
initially more progressive views are reduced more sharply when they fre-
quently partake in religious services (see Figure 4). The same is not found 































FiGURe 3: Gendered Relations between Salience and Support for Gender 
equality (N = 19,009)
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Model 3 furthermore shows that, among women, the negative impact of 
salience, but not devotion, is weakened by education; these findings sup-
port hypothesis 6, but only in one specific case. Overall, Models 2 and 3 
suggest that while womanhood and education form a buffer against the 
impact of one’s own beliefs, socialization via religious services reduces 
the room for agentic reinterpretations deviating from societally dominant 
norms, diminishing women’s and more highly educated citizens’ initially 
greater support for gender equality.
Interdependent Religiosity
Finally, Model 4 shows that salience and devotion weaken the impact of 
service attendance and textualism, respectively.6 For instance, across the 
MENA, people who attend services (one standard deviation) more often 
show increased opposition to gender equality, with 1.2 points, as compared 
to citizens for whom religion is averagely salient. All other things being 
equal, among individuals for whom religion and God are more important 
in their lives (salience) the impact of attending religious services is only 
(1.16 – 0.42) 0.7. Not all expected interaction effects were found to be 
statistically significant, but they were all in the expected direction. These 
findings thus provide some support for hypothesis 7; the patriarchal influ-
ence of doctrinal religious beliefs and communal practices seems to be 
mitigated by having stronger affective religious beliefs (i.e., salience or 
devotion). What is more, all results together pinpoint religious salience as 
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FiGURe 4: Religious Service Attendance and Support for Gender equality 
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ence of exposure to the institutional religious patriarchy may not be buff-
ered by womanhood or education, but it is by (affective) religion itself.
Robustness Tests
We conducted additional analyses as robustness checks. As mentioned 
above, we estimated our models on subsamples (only Muslims, women, and 
men) and within individual country-years; divergent results are indicated in 
Table 2 and Appendix 2. We also varied the inclusion and operationalization 
of the religiosity variables by including respondents with missing scores 
on denomination and service attendance (classifying them as a separate 
group); additionally distinguishing between the nonreligious and religious 
non-Muslims; and including prayer and particularism, although then 
many cases have to be excluded from the analyses.7
Our main results are robust for each of these alternatives. For instance, 
our additional measurements of religiosity relate to support for gender 
equality as expected, which provides further support for hypothesis 1 in 
particular (see online Appendix 3). As individual prayer is not signifi-
cantly related to support for gender equality, it seems that it is the actual 
exposure to others in services that serves a patriarchal socialization func-
tion, and not practicing religion in and of itself. Moreover, particularism 
shows a clear negative relation with support for gender equality, which 
further supports our conclusion that adherence to orthodox doctrinal 
beliefs diminishes support for gender equality—also when the measure is 
not focused on one particular issue (as textualism was).
CONCLUSION
This study addressed relations between different dimensions of religios-
ity and support for gender equality, and how they differed for women and 
more highly educated individuals in the Arab MENA. We did so based on 
a newly developed agentic and gendered socialization framework, which 
we tested on data from 15 WVS surveys from between 2001 and 2014. At 
its core, the agentic and gendered socialization framework proposes that 
while MENA citizens are embedded in dominantly patriarchal religious 
structures, they are not solely or uniformly passively socialized by religios-
ity, as previous large-scale studies implied (cf. Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Price 2016). Instead, the framework proposes that religious socialization is 
gendered and that people can reinterpret their religion and thus actively 
deviate from patriarchal interpretations (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 
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2003; Kandiyoti 1988; Korteweg 2008; Rinaldo 2014; Sewell 1992).
This framework implies that a disaggregated, multidimensional con-
ceptualization of religiosity is needed, instead of focusing on differences 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, as previous studies have done (e.g., 
Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Norris 2009). This is 
because rigid patriarchal religious structures obstruct support for gender 
equality while other dimensions of religiosity stimulate emancipatory 
advancements (see Cornwall et al. 1986; Hall 1997; Nyhagen 2017; Stark 
and Glock 1968). Indeed, our results consistently showed that while reli-
gious service attendance, textualism, and devotion decreased support for 
gender equality, the salience of religious beliefs in life choices had no 
singularly negative impact. Among women we even found that religious 
salience increases support for gender equality (cf. Scheepers, Gijsberts, 
and Hello 2002). Moreover, even though religious salience does not con-
sistently fuel support for gender equality (as was expected), it was the 
only moderator in our analyses that buffered the negative impact of expo-
sure to the institutional patriarchy in religious services. All in all, these 
findings showed that most but not all dimensions of religiosity serve 
patriarchal socialization, and that using religion as a guideline in daily life 
is thus the main (or only) safeguard to the patriarchal influence of expo-
sure to religious institutions. Translating findings from in-depth qualita-
tive studies, religious salience thus seems to be the key to reinterpreting 
religion along more emancipatory lines (e.g., Aune 2015; Jansen 2004; 
Mir-Hosseini 2006).
At the core of our framework are genderedness and agency. 
Consequently, we also proposed that relations between religiosity and 
support for gender equality vary between different societal groups. 
Indeed, religious service attendance was more strongly negatively related 
to support for gender equality among women and more highly educated 
individuals, as service attendance reduced women’s and more highly edu-
cated citizens’ initially greater support (see Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, 
and Lueptow 2001; Moghadam 2013; Zion-Waldoks 2015). So it seems 
that among those who have the space to deviate from dominant patriarchal 
interpretations, that is, those exposed less to patriarchal religious institu-
tions, especially women and more highly educated individuals use that 
space to progressively reinterpret their religion (Al-Hibri 1982; Moghissi 
2011; Prickett 2015; Read and Bartkowski 2000).
Also, the negative impact of (internal) religious beliefs, particularly 
religious salience, was weaker among women and more highly educated 
individuals. Again it seems that given the space for renegotiations, women 
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and more highly educated individuals more often seek or accept emanci-
patory reinterpretations of their religion conducive to support for gender 
equality, as suggested by previous qualitative studies (Avishai, Jafar, and 
Rinaldo 2015; Kandiyoti 1988; Khurshid 2015; Prickett 2015). Women 
and more highly educated citizens thus tend to be at the forefront of rene-
gotiating the religiosity–gender inequality coupling.
Based on this summary of results, two core contributions of this study 
to the literature can be highlighted. First, we have shown that religiosity 
is a medley. Previous quantitative studies mainly studied denomination 
(e.g., Alexander and Welzel 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and 
Fish 2016), while we theorized a more fine-grained and gendered version 
of religion’s relation to support for gender equality. We showed in greater 
detail how (disaggregated) religiosity works and that it is not always a 
hindrance to support for gender equality in the MENA. Especially, reli-
gious salience (among women) cushions the blow to support for gender 
equality of other religiosity dimensions.
Second, previous public opinion studies focused on patriarchal sociali-
zation, implying that individuals in the MENA are passive beings (see 
Said 1979; Spierings 2015). This study provided evidence that people 
who are more inclined (women) and sociocognitively better equipped 
(higher educated) can and do cushion patriarchal interpretations of their 
religiosity. Future research would do well to not only consider MENA 
citizens as unilaterally passively socialized but also as active agents in a 
gendered context.
Other important avenues for future research can be derived from some 
of the challenges we faced, particularly regarding data availability. First, 
despite taking considerable steps forward, we were unable to tap into 
every form of religious socialization. For instance, no data were available 
on religious socialization in schools or parental homes. The socialization 
processes in these domains may be similar to religious socialization that 
our data did cover, but that remains an empirical question to tackle in 
future research. Second, panel data provide more insights into the assumed 
causality of religious socialization, but such data are currently unavaila-
ble. Consequently, we could not empirically show that women’s and more 
highly educated citizens’ support for gender equality is reduced due to 
service attendance, instead of women and more highly educated citizens 
who attended services being more conservative from the start. However, 
there are distinct reasons to assume some causality; MENA citizens are 
embedded in religious structures by birth, and previous studies have pro-
posed religious socialization processes are ever-present, implying that 
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religious socialization predates people forming their opinions on gender 
equality. Moreover, our models controlled for core variables linked to 
religiosity and gender equality attitudes, such as education (Alexander 
and Welzel 2011; Aune 2015).
Third, some indicators of religiosity leave room for improvement. For 
instance, textualism could not be measured directly. We expect that other 
aspects of textualism would provide similar results—an expectation sup-
ported by our results concerning particularism—but further empirical 
study is welcome. Similarly, regarding salience we had no measures on 
the importance of religion in specific daily choices (Scheepers, Gijsberts, 
and Hello 2002). However and if anything, most likely this has led to an 
underestimation of salience’s relation to support for gender equality.
Finally, we recommend that future researchers look into different 
domains of support for gender equality. Although our theory predicts 
roughly similar patterns, only empirical study can verify this. The vast 
majority of large-scale quantitative studies pertain to public sphere atti-
tudes; studying support for equality in the private sphere or sexual eman-
cipation would greatly add to our knowledge (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 
2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Price 2016). Current data do not permit this, 
however. For instance, the WVS includes an item on the justifiability of 
divorce, but it is hard to discern whether men and women filling out the 
questionnaire had talaq or khul’ in mind—men’s unilateral right to 
divorce or divorce that women can initiate (Shehada 2016).
Still, to our knowledge, this study has included more precise and 
nuanced measurements of religiosity’s impact on gender equality attitudes 
than any other MENA study. Studying the multidimensional facets of 
religiosity, as well as their interrelated and particularly agency-moderated 
influences, has provided important and more nuanced insights into the 
gendered impact religiosity has on support for gender equality in the 
MENA, which is pivotal for women in the MENA as well as for public 
debates around the world.
NOTES
1. The Quran states, “And no person can ever die except by Allah’s leave and 
at an appointed time” (3:145, Khan trans.), and Bukhari’s Hadith (4.56.669) 
reports Allah’s response to a man who has taken his own life, “My Slave hurried 
to bring death upon himself so I have forbidden him (to enter) Paradise.”
2. In our sample, women attended services less than men; still, about one-third 
frequents religious services weekly or more.
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3. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
4. In the Bahrain 2014 survey, employment and education loaded on two fac-
tors. The pooled analysis showed high factor loadings (0.78 [politics], 0.63 [edu-
cation], 0.72 [employment]) on one dimension, although Cronbach’s alpha was 
moderate (0.50), probably because of the number of items.
5. F tests showed that support’s variation over time is marginal compared to 
between countries, justifying our data structure. Also, the much debated minimal 
number of higher-level units is not very relevant, as we add no higher-level predictors.
6. The interaction terms largely (just) lose their statistical significance in the 
men-only model, but they remain similar in the women-only and Muslim-only 
subsamples.
7. Eleven surveys include frequency of private prayer. We standardized scores 
per survey. Thirteen surveys included particularism as follows: “On this list are 
various groups of people. Which would you not like to have as neighbors?” The 
answer “from a different religion” is scored 1, others 0. Details can be obtained 
from the authors.
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